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Abstract: This paper presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between fiscal illusion and 
the shadow economy for 104 countries over the period 1989–2009. We argue that both 
unobservable phenomena are closely linked to each other, as the creation of a fiscal illusion may 
be helpful if governments want to control shadow economic activities. Using a MIMIC model 
with two latent variables we confirm previous findings on the driving forces of the shadow 
economy and identify the main determinants and indicators of fiscal illusion. Most importantly, 
we find that fiscal illusion negatively affects the shadow economy: Concealing the real tax burden 
through fiscal illusion potentially contributes to the government’s efforts to repress shadow 
economic activities. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper expands previous research on the shadow economy and fiscal illusion. Both, 
the shadow economy, i.e. the production and distribution of goods and services concealed 
from the government, and fiscal illusion, i.e. the systematic delusion of key fiscal 
parameters by taxpayers, are two important – to our opinion – closely linked economic 
phenomena. On the one hand, the more effective the government can create a fiscal 
illusion, the more likely it is that voters underestimate the actual or true tax burden of 
government activities. This potentially affects the size and development of the shadow 
economy, as the tax burden is often found to be its most important determinant. Hence, 
the systematic misperception of the true tax burden should reduce people’s incentives to 
work in the shadow economy, as they feel less depleted by public spending. On the other 
hand, the existence of a large shadow economy potentially incentivizes fiscally 
illusionary policies. In countries with a large shadow economy, weak institutions and an 
environment of mistrust towards government policies may make only the instrument of 
fiscal illusion available to the government to reduce the perceived pressure of taxation 
and thus the shadow economy. Hence, a sizable shadow economy can go hand in hand 
with a high level of fiscal illusion.  
Although both phenomena are not observable, they leave traces such as the frequency 
of cash transactions and the complexity of the tax system that can be used to study their 
relationship. For the first time we analyze the interaction between the shadow economy 
and fiscal illusion using a multiple indicator multiple causes (MIMIC) model with two 
latent variables. Selecting appropriate causes and indicator of these two unobservable 
phenomena we investigate the driving forces behind the shadow economy and fiscal 
illusion. Differently to previous studies applying a MIMIC model, we do not focus on the 
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measurement of either latent variable. Rather we apply the MIMIC model to explore the 
mutual interactions between the shadow economy and fiscal illusion. We hypothesize that 
the better a government is able to “create” a fiscal illusion, the smaller the shadow 
economy is, all other things being equal. Hence, governments may use fiscal illusion as 
an additional tool to control shadow economic activities. A second contribution of this 
paper is to join two strands of the literature, i.e., the literature on fiscal illusion and the 
literature on the shadow economy.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some theoretical 
considerations about the potential relationship between fiscal illusion and the shadow 
economy. In Section 3, we present the empirical analysis studying the shadow economy 
and fiscal illusion simultaneously in a MIMIC model. Section 4 briefly summarizes the 
most important findings and concludes.  
 
2. Fiscal Illusion and the Shadow Economy 
The traditional view on the concept of fiscal illusion is the systematic misperception of 
key fiscal parameters (taxes) by taxpayers, distorting fiscal choices.1 Mill (1848 [1994], p. 
237) already discussed the perception of different taxes: ‘‘If all taxes were direct, taxation 
would be much more perceived than at present, and there would be a security, which now 
there is not, for economy in the public expenditure.’’ Mill’s seminal observation indicates 
that one important nature of fiscal illusion is political illusion. It occurs when politicians 
use fiscal instruments to deceive taxpayers making them feel paying less than they are 
                                                 
1 The paper focuses on the relationship between fiscal illusion and the shadow economy and does for this 
reason discuss the literature only briefly. A comprehensive literature review on fiscal illusion is presented in 
Dell’Anno and Mourão (2012). The empirical literature on fiscal illusion is surveyed in Dollery and 
Worthington (1996). Schneider and Enste (2000) present an excellent survey about the shadow economy, 
also including different measurement methodologies, which we do not discuss here. 
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actually contributing to government programs (Fasiani 1941). In this sense, taxpayers 
potentially attribute more value to public expenditures than they are worth, which in the 
end leads to a public sector of excessive size (Oates 1988).  
To disguise taxpayers, politicians have several options. Firstly, designing a tax 
system more complex makes it more difficult for taxpayers to understand its significant 
elements. As a consequence they very likely underestimate their effective tax burden, 
allowing the government to increase public expenditures without the full perception of 
taxpayers (Wagner 1976; Cullis and Jones 1987). Fiscal illusion is also created if 
governments finance expenditures by debt rather than by tax revenues. According to the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem people would be indifferent between debt and tax 
financing if they had rational expectations.2 Since they do not, they experience a fiscal 
illusion or more precisely debt illusion, underestimating future tax liabilities in the form 
of current public debt. In other words, current taxation generates higher levels of 
perception of the true burden than public indebtedness. This distortion leads to a 
systematic underestimation of public expenditures and the cost of government programs. 
Fiscal illusion is thus the systematic distortion of taxpayer’s perceptions by the 
government.  
In contrast, the shadow economy is often defined as all economic activity – and 
income earned from it – that circumvent government regulation, taxation, or observation. 
Hence, shadow economic activities include unreported income from otherwise official 
trade in goods and services, i.e., all economic activities that would generally be taxable 
were they reported to government (tax) authorities are part of the shadow economy. This 
                                                 
2
 However, rational expectations are a necessary but not sufficient condition for Ricardian Equivalence. See 
Seater (1993) for a survey on this topic. 
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broad definition of the shadow economy is however difficult to implement empirically. 
To make it applicable for the empirical analysis presented in section 3, we introduce the 
following more narrow definition: the shadow economy comprises all market-based, 
lawful production or trade of goods and services deliberately concealed from public 
authorities in order to evade either payment of income, value added or other taxes, or 
social security contributions; to get around certain labor market standards, such as 
minimum wages, maximum working hours, or safety standards; or to avoid compliance 
with administrative procedures. This definition does not include illegal economic 
activities, such as burglary, robbery, or drug dealing. 
The discussion of both phenomena in the preceding two paragraphs suggests that 
fiscal illusion and the shadow economy are interrelated phenomena and may be two sides 
of the same coin. On the one hand, an economy with a large shadow sector reduces the 
quality of institutions and is potentially characterized by low attitudes towards the state. 
Hence, policymakers are probably keen to apply several strategies limiting the size of the 
shadow economy. Standard policy instruments often recommended by economist are – in 
addition to tax reforms reducing the tax and regulatory burden – to increase the 
effectiveness of tax auditing, the enforcement of tax rules and regulations, or the 
punishment of shadow workers or tax evaders. An alternative way for politicians to 
deplete the shadow economy may is to systematically distort the true tax burden of 
citizens. Assuming that policymakers explore all available policy options, a higher 
shadow economy can potentially be an incentive for policymakers to adopt strategies to 
hide the true tax burden to taxpayers. In this way they can avoid a further increase or even 
induce a reduction of tax evasion and the shadow economy. Hence, a higher shadow 
economy may lead to a higher level of fiscal illusion, all other things being equal.  
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If the government successfully creates the illusion of a lower tax burden, individuals 
do have fewer incentives to escape into the shadow economy or to evade taxes. As a 
consequence, the shadow economy should be smaller in the presence of a high level of 
fiscal illusion. Alternatively, however, it might be possible that the existence of the 
shadow economy is just an indication of the government’s failure to create a fiscal 
illusion. Because citizens correctly perceive their true tax burden, they realize 
contributing too much to government programs. By escaping into the shadow economy or 
evading taxes, they can reduce their effective tax burden to a level that matches the value 
they attribute to public expenditures programs. The next section presents a structural 
equation model, which allows us to empirically investigate this mutual relationship 
between fiscal illusion and the shadow economy. 
 
3. The Empirical Analysis  
3.1 The SEM and MIMIC approaches  
Structural Equation Models (SEM) are based on statistical relationships among latent (i.e. 
unobservable) and manifest (i.e. observable) variables to simultaneously estimate 
relationships between multiple independent, dependent and latent variables. Combining 
factor analysis and the multivariate regression model, SEM integrate two important 
aspects of economic analysis: (1) variable measurability and observability and (2) the 
identification of their causal relationships. In this paper, a special type of a SEM is 
employed, i.e., a MIMIC model with two latent variables, to study the nexus between 
fiscal illusion and the shadow economy. 
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A MIMIC model has two parts: a measurement model and a structural model. The 
measurement model specifies the relationships between latent variables (shadow 
economy and fiscal illusion) and their indicators. In matrix notation, it is given by: 
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(1) 
where the latent variables (f1 and f2) determine linearly, subject to disturbances ε , a set of 
six endogenous indicators (y). Each of these latent variables has three observable 
indicators. The covariance matrix of the measurement errors, ε , is given by the matrix 
εΘ .3 
The structural equation model linearly determines the latent variables f1 and f2 by a 
set of eight exogenous causes (x). Because the structural equation model only partially 
explains the latent variables, the structural disturbance error terms ζ1 and ζ2
 
represent the 
unexplained components. We assume Β to be a ( )2 8×  matrix of structural coefficients 
describing the “causal” relationships between the latent variables f1 and f2 and their 
causes. In matrix notation, it is given as: 
                                                 
3
 In the standard MIMIC model (Jöreskog and Goldberger 1975), the measurement errors are assumed to be 
independent of each other, but this restriction can be relaxed (Stapleton 1978). In this paper, several 
covariances between indicators are relaxed since they are empirically and theoretically plausible. Figure 1 
shows some of these estimated covariances. 
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(2) 
Without loss of generality, all variables are considered to carry zero expectations, i.e., 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0E f E x E y = = =  , and the variances of the structural disturbance error terms ζ1 
and ζ2
 
are abbreviated by a non-diagonal matrix Ψ . The MIMIC model assumes that 
( ) ( ) 0E Eζ ε= = ; the error terms do not correlate with the causes ( ) 0E xζ =  ; the 
error terms in the measurement model do not correlate either with the causes 
( ) 0E xε ′ =   or with the latent variables ( ) 0E f ε ′ =  ; and, finally, the measurement 
errors do not correlate with structural disturbances ( ) 0E εζ =  . 
There exist several equivalent ways to represent a SEM. One of the simplest is the 
RAM (Reticular Action Model) formulation of McArdle (1980) and McArdle and 
McDonald (1984). This formulation considers a vector v containing the observable 
indicator variables, the observable causal variables and the latent variables, and a vector 
u, of observable causal variables, measurement errors, and structural disturbances. The 
vectors v and u are linked by equation (3) as follows:  
 
v Av u= + ,             (3) 
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where A  is a matrix including the structural and measurement coefficients. The 
covariance matrix of u is ( )P E uu′= .4 Furthermore, ( )'W E vv=  denotes the covariances 
of the observables, computed directly from the sample. Assuming that I A−  is non-
singular, equation (3) can be rewritten as ( ) 1v I A u−= −  and
 
( ) ( )1 11 1W A P A− − ′= − −
. Let 
( )'E mm∑ =  be the estimated covariance matrix of the observable variables and J a 
“filter matrix” which carries v  into ,m Jv=
 
we get:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1' ' ' ' 1 1E mm JE vv J JWJ J A P A J− − ′ ′∑ = = = = − − . Assuming multivariate 
normality, the maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters in A and P are calculated 
by minimizing the discrepancy between W and the covariance matrix ∑  implied by the 
model:  
 ( )1ln lnMLF tr W W n−= ∑ + ∑ − − ,            (4) 
where |.| indicates the determinant of a matrix, tr indicates its trace, n is the sum of the 
number of observable endogenous indicators (y) and observable exogenous causes (x). 
The necessary condition for identification is that the number of structural parameters 
should be equal to the number of reduced-form parameters. An observation of the 
reduced-form parameters shows that unique solutions to the measurement and structural 
parameters λ  and β  cannot be obtained from the reduced-form model. This occurs 
because altering the scale of either f1 and f2 yields an infinite number of solutions for λ  
and β  from the same reduced-form solution. The inability to obtain unique solutions for 
λ  and β  causes an identification problem that can be solved by (i) constraining one of 
                                                 
4
 Appendix B presents the estimated elements of the A and P matrices for our preferred specification 
(MIMIC 8-2-6). To facilitate understanding of the MIMIC model presented in this paper for LISREL-users, 
we adopt LISREL symbols in the RAM formulation. 
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the paths from the latent variable to one of its indicator variables, or by (ii) fixing the 
variances of the structural disturbance error terms, ψ11 and ψ22 to 1. In this paper we 
consider the latter alternative to identify the model more appropriate as we do not aim to 
use the MIMIC model estimates to assess the size of the unobservable variables.5  
 
3.2 Observable structural causes and indicators of both latent variables 
An extensive literature exists on the empirical analysis of the shadow economy and fiscal 
illusion. The previous section has made clear that the rationale behind the selection of the 
observable variables is a key issue for the MIMIC approach. Duncan (1975) points out 
that the meaning of the latent variables, and hence the reliability of the estimates, depends 
on how comprehensively the causal and indicator variables correspond to the intended 
content of the latent variables. To define the latent variable shadow economy as precise as 
possible, six potential causes and three indicators are chosen. Given data availability, the 
structural model investigates the relationships between the shadow economy (f1) and the 
following variables6: 
X1, Personal income tax: The higher (lower) the individual income tax burden, the larger 
(smaller) the shadow economy, ceteris paribus; i.e., β11>0. 
X2, Corporate income tax: The higher (lower) the corporate income tax rate, the larger 
(smaller) the shadow economy, ceteris paribus; i.e., β12>0. 
                                                 
5
 The first alternative is superior when the model is used to estimate the size of latent variables as it anchors 
the meaning of latent variable to the dimension of the reference indicator. See Dell’Anno (2007) for details. 
6
 There is an intensive discussion, why the variables X1, X2, X4 and X5 are key factors or driving forces for 
shadow economy activities. Compare for example Schneider and Enste (2000), Schneider (2005) and Feld 
and Schneider (2010). 
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X3, Unemployment rate: The higher (lower) the unemployment rate, the more (less) time 
and incentives people have to work underground and hence the bigger (smaller) is the 
shadow economy, ceteris paribus; i.e., β13>0. 
X4, Business freedom: A fourth important determinant may affecting the size of the 
shadow economy is the burden of regulation for business activities. To take the extent of 
business regulations into account, we employ the index of business freedom, as estimated 
by the Heritage Foundation. It seems reasonable to assume that the greater the business 
freedom (i.e. the higher the index score), the lower the size of the shadow economy. 
According to this view, we expect the estimated coefficient to be negative, i.e., β14<0. 
X5, Tax burden: Tax revenues as percentage of GDP are used as measure of the overall 
tax burden in an economy, which potentially influences both, the extent of fiscal illusion 
and the size of the shadow economy. The higher the tax burden the stronger the incentives 
for individuals to operate in the shadow economy and for the government to delude the 
true burden through fiscal illusion. We thus use the overall tax burden as potential cause 
for both the shadow economy and fiscal illusion and expect a higher (lower) overall tax 
burden to provoke more (less) shadow economic activities, ceteris paribus, i.e., β15>0.  
For fiscal illusion, four main structural causes, enhancing the efficacy of fiscal illusion, 
and three main categories of policies, capable of distorting taxpayers’ perceptions of their 
true tax burden, are selected. As argued above, we believe that the tax burden can be seen 
as a proxy for policymakers’ needs to reduce the perception of tax pressure. A higher 
(effective) tax burden encourages the government to adopt tax policies aimed at 
increasing fiscal illusion. Thus, the expected correlation between the overall tax burden 
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and fiscal illusion is positive, i.e., β25>0. Further important determinants of fiscal illusion 
are: 
X6, Self-employment: This variable is considered as potential cause for both fiscal 
illusion and the shadow economy. The shadow economy literature presents unambiguous 
evidence that self-employed have much more possibilities to work in the shadow 
economy, hence the higher the self-employment ratio is, the larger the shadow economy 
should be, ceteris paribus, i.e. β16>0. 7 
Concerning fiscal illusion, a higher ratio of self-employed to the totally employed 
population can increase the policymaker’s needs to conceal the tax burden. Fasiani (1941) 
already argued that a higher self-employment ratio requires a higher degree or more 
“active” tax compliance as the system of withholding income tax is rather partial for self-
employed. Hence, we expect a higher self-employment ratio to increase the level of fiscal 
illusion because it incentivizes policymakers to distort the perception of the tax burden, 
i.e. β26>0. 
X7, Top income tax rate: We assume that a higher (statutory) top income tax rate 
encourages a government to adopt tax policies aimed at creating a fiscal illusion.8 A 
highly visible statutory top income tax rate very likely produces perceptions of a 
burdensome tax regime, which result in high electoral cost for the government. Buchanan 
(1967, p. 140) states that  “the institution of progression, per se, tends to create an excess 
                                                 
7
 Compare e.g. the survey of Feld and Schneider (2010) and the references mentioned there. 
8
 We assume that the top marginal tax rate does not affect the size of the shadow economy directly but only 
through fiscal illusion. This hypothesis is motivated by the intuition that only a minority of taxpayers (i.e. 
those with the highest income) are actually subject to this tax rate. In this sense, the top statutory tax rate 
mainly affects the taxpayers’ perceptions of the tax burden. That is, although the two measures are related 
( )57 0σ ≠
, 
the top statutory tax rate has a direct effect on fiscal illusion only.  
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feeling of tax burden on the part of the taxpayer. The effect here stems from the 
divergence between the average and the marginal rate of tax, and the observed tendency 
of persons to think in terms of marginal rates.” Thus, the expected correlation between the 
top (statutory) income tax rate and fiscal illusion is positive, i.e. β27>0. 
X8, Secondary school enrolment: The fourth potential cause of fiscal illusion takes into 
account the ability of a society to correctly evaluate the beneficiaries of both tax reforms 
and public expenditure programs. Assuming that this ability depends on the average level 
of education, we take into account the secondary school enrolment rate, i.e. the ratio of 
children enrolled in secondary education to the population of official secondary education 
age. A more educated society should make it more difficult for policymakers to 
effectively implement fiscal illusion policies to distort taxpayers’ perceptions. Thus, we 
expect a negative correlation between the secondary school enrolment rate and fiscal 
illusion, i.e. β28<0. 
Finally, we include a dummy variable for the OECD countries (X9) to verify whether 
structural differences between OECD countries and non-OECD countries exist. The 
measurement model includes three variables that are typically used in the literature as 
indicators of the shadow economy. In addition, three variables, representing the most 
common strategies to reduce citizens’ perceptions of the true tax burdens, are employed 
as indicators of fiscal illusion. In particular, the measurement model links the following 
six indicators to the unobservable variables:9  
                                                 
9
 There is a vast literature on possible indicators of the shadow economy. Compare e.g. Schneider and Enste 
(2000), Feld and Schneider (2010), and Schneider et al. (2010). 
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Y1, Labor force participation: A low (high) labor force participation rate in the official 
economy may be seen as indication of prevalent (rare) shadow economic activities, 
ceteris paribus. We thus expect λ11<0. 
Y2, Growth rate of real GDP: The theoretical literature does not offer unambiguous 
guidance concerning the effects of the shadow economy on official economy and vice 
versa.10 For instance, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) show that countries experiencing a 
decline in official GDP were able to mitigate the consequences through growth of the 
shadow economy. On the contrary, Chong and Gradstein (2007) find a positive – 
potentially demand-side driven – relationship between the shadow economy and official 
growth. Following the slight prevalence of a positive correlation found in the empirical 
literature, we expect that the higher the official growth rate of real GDP is, the larger the 
shadow economy, ceteris paribus, i.e., λ12>0. 
Y3, Currency ratio: It is commonly assumed that cash is used to pay for goods and 
services produced in the shadow economy as it leaves no trace compared to bank transfers 
or other tractable payment methods. We thus expect a positive sign for the coefficient of 
the currency ratio, ceteris paribus, i.e., λ13  >0. 
Y4, Public debt: A common strategy to create fiscal illusion is to increase public debt. The 
motivation behind this argument is that taxpayers are more likely to perceive the cost of 
public programs if they pay for them through current taxation than if tax liabilities are 
deferred through public-sector borrowing (Oates 1988). Hence, we expect a positive 
correlation between fiscal illusion and public debt, ceteris paribus, i.e., λ24>0.  
                                                 
10
 For an overview see Dell’Anno (2008). 
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Y5, Share of indirect taxation: The second variable included as indicator of fiscal illusion 
is the share of indirect taxation. According to the “Mill hypothesis”, fiscal extraction 
through indirect taxation is underestimated compared to direct taxation because it is less 
visible to taxpayers. The “Mill' hypothesis” stressed by Schmölders (1960) and Buchanan 
(1967), represents one of the most common forms policymakers use to reduce the 
perceived sacrifice of taxpayers. In this sense, a positive coefficient is expected for the 
share of indirect taxation, ceteris paribus, i.e., λ25>0. 
Y6, Tax complexity: Finally, we use the complexity of the tax system as indicator of 
fiscal illusion. The more complex and complicated a tax and revenue system, the more 
likely it is that taxpayers underestimate the tax burden and misperceive the true tax 
liabilities, all other things being equal. Following Wagner (1976), we compute the 
Herfindahl index (H) of a country’s revenue system.11 A higher value of this index means 
a less complex revenue system; the revenue-complexity hypothesis thus posits a negative 
coefficient for the Herfindahl index of tax complexity, i.e., λ26< 0.  
Figure 1 shows the path diagram of the final MIMIC model, including eight causes, two 
latent variables and six indicators. It has been estimated for an unbalanced panel of a 
cross-section of 104 countries over the period 1989 to 2009 (21 years). The list of 
countries included in the sample as well as the definitions and data sources are provided 
in Appendix A. As common, the observable variables in Figure 1 are represented by 
rectangles and the latent variables by ovals. An arrow represents the effect of one variable 
on the other and the parameters represent the coefficients to be estimated. The arrows 
                                                 
11
 We follow the literature and use different types of taxation to compute the Herfindahl index. See 
Appendix A for details. 
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linking indicators and causes among themselves indicate the estimated covariances 
among the structural and measurement errors in the MIMIC model.  
To make the SEM approach suitable to the data set’s panel structure, we transform 
the observable variables into deviations from the country mean over the sample period. 
This transformation meets the assumption that all variables have zero expectations, i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0E F E x E y = = =  , since the variables now have the same mean (zero) across 
countries. The deviations from the country mean are computed as follows: 
xjit = xjit
r
− x ji / N
t
∑




; yjit = yjitr − yji / N
t
∑




,              (5) 
where superscript r denotes raw data; j = 1, 2,…, 14 indicates the observable causes and 
indicators variables; i = 1, 2,…, 104 denotes the number of countries; t = 1989,…, 2009 
specifies the observation period; and N is the number of non-missing observations for 
each country. This approach makes it feasible to consider heterogeneity across cross-
sectional units in the MIMIC model and is motivated by the relevance of country fixed 
effects in the model.  
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Figure 1: Path Diagram MIMIC 8-2-6 
 
 
Table 1 shows the results of three MIMIC model specifications: MIMIC 8-2-6  in terms 
of statistical reliability; MIMIC 7-2-6 and MIMIC 6-2-6 are models that include a dummy 
for the OECD countries (x9) to take into account unobserved differences between OECD 
and non-OECD countries.  
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Table 1: MIMIC models and parameter estimates 
  MIMIC 8-2-6 MIMIC 7-2-6 MIMIC 6-2-6 
Causes  SE FI SE FI SE FI 
Personal income tax β11 
0.002 
(0.291) - - - - - 
Corporate income tax β12 
0.045* 
(2.507) - - - 
0.023 
(1.449) - 
Unemployment rate β13 
-0.010* 
(-2.256) - 
-0.169* 
(-2.489) - 
-0.082* 
(-3.738) - 
Business Freedom 
index β14 
0.002 
(1.618) - 
0.023* 
(2.510) - 
0.013* 
(3.066) - 
Tax burden β15 ; β25 
0.009* 
(2.596) 
0.015* 
(5.417) 
0.036 
(1.788) 
0.019* 
(3.985) - - 
Self-employment rate β16 ; β26 0.002 (0.934) 
-0.003 
(-1.265) 
-0.003 
(-0.449) 
-0.001 
(-0.233) - - 
Top income tax rate β27 - 
-0.002 
(-1.593) - 
-0.020* 
(-6.838) - 
-0.054* 
(-4.097) 
Secondary education β28 - 
-0.002* 
(-2.289) - 
-0.007* 
(-4.587) - 
-0.019* 
(-3.292) 
OECD dummy β19 ; β29 - - 
0.014 
(0.247) 
0.019 
(0.706) 
-0.002 
(-0.054) 
0.045 
(0.628) 
Indicators        
Labor force 
participation λ11 
36.794 
(0.509) - 
2.407* 
(3.178) - 
5.406* 
(2.766) - 
Growth rate  
of real GDP per capita λ12 
4.774 
(0.403) - 
-5.066* 
(-4.422) - 
-8.961* 
(-2.578) - 
Currency ratio λ13 
-22.066 
(-0.469) - 
0.046 
(0.585) - 
-4.641 
(-1.300) - 
Public debt  
in % of GDP λ24 - 
0.156 
(1.283) - 
-82.484* 
(-4.506) - 
-30.867* 
(-4.031) 
Indirect taxes/ 
direct taxes λ25 - 
-6.315* 
(-144.7) - 
-0.535* 
(-2.134) - 
0.016 
(0.739) 
Herfindahl index  
of tax revenue λ26 - 
-0.001* 
(-3.869) - 
0.057* 
(3.332) - 
-0.003* 
(-3.302) 
Interactions terms        
Shadow ec.  
fiscal illusion (η12) η12 
4.464 
(0.508) 
0.724* 
(4.459) 
4.192* 
(2.711) 
Fiscal illusion  
shadow ec. (η21) η21 
-0.994* 
(-120.074) 
-6.019* 
(-2.212) 
-0.943* 
(-35.918) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics     
χ
2(p-value)  373.066 (0.00) 214.497 (0.00) 207.752 (0.00) 
Degrees of freedom  66 54 45 
RMSEA  0.046 0.037 0.041 
P-value for test of close 
fit (RMSEA<0.05) 
 0.913 1.00 0.997 
Notes: t-Statistics are given in parentheses. * means |t-statistic|>1.96. The degrees of freedom are 
determined using the expression 0.5(n)(n+1)–t, where n is the number of observable causes and 
indicators and t the number of free parameters. All models assume that the matrix of structural 
disturbances (ψ12) is symmetric. In specification MIMIC 8-2-6, the matrix of covariances among 
the causes (σij) is set free, excluding the covariances among the dummy of OECD countries and 
the remaining causes. 
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Several criteria can be used to assess the fit of SEM models. The chi-square (χ2) 
distribution for the goodness of fit is the classical test to evaluate differences between the 
observable data and the model prediction. A small χ2 is typically a sign of a good model 
fit. This test is however sensitive to the sample size; for samples of more than 200 
observations, as in our study, the test tends to reject the model even when the fit is 
adequate (Barrett 2007). In other words, large samples will increase the chance of 
observing p-values lower than 0.05. Due to this drawback of the χ2-test, alternative fit 
statistics have been developed. One of the most frequently used statistics is the Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) proposed by Steiger and Lind (1980). 
The RMSEA incorporates a penalty function for poor model parsimony and thus becomes 
sensitive to the number of parameters estimated and relatively insensitive to the sample 
size (Brown 2006). A rule of thumb is that RMSEA values less than 0.08 indicate an 
adequate fit and values below 0.05 suggest an excellent fit (Browne and Cudeck 1992). P-
values higher than 0.10 for the test of close fit based on the RMSEA indicate a good fit; 
the fit is inadequate if the p-value is below 0.05. The RMSEA p-values of all three 
models estimated and shown in Table 1 reveal a good fit.  
However, in our analysis we encounter frequent cases of indefinite matrix problems, 
which limits our options to specify alternative MIMIC models and makes the estimates 
less robust across different model specifications. Monte Carlo studies though demonstrate 
(see e.g. Anderson and Gerbing 1984; Boomsma 1982, 1985) that problems of non-
positive definite matrices arise frequently when data provides relatively little information 
such as few observable indicator variables, small factor loadings or a high number of 
missing values (Bollen and Long 1993). Given that both specifications MIMIC 7-2-6 and 
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MIMIC 6-2-6 do not have positive (semi-)definite matrices of structural errors, we 
consider the specification MIMIC 8-2-6 as the most reliable model.  
In this specification, the estimated coefficient between fiscal illusion and the shadow 
economy is negatively significant, while the coefficient for the effect of the shadow 
economy on fiscal illusion is insignificant. That is, if fiscal illusion increases the shadow 
economy reduces, all other things being equal, while a variation in the size of the shadow 
economy does not have a feedback effect on fiscal illusion. The two alternative MIMIC 
model specifications, i.e., MIMIC 7-2-6 and MIMIC 6-2-6, point to a significantly 
positive relationship between the shadow economy and fiscal illusion. We are however 
cautious to draw conclusions from this result due to the econometric imperfections 
outlined in the previous paragraph. 
The results of the MIMIC model concerning the size and development of the shadow 
economy clearly show that the overall tax burden and the corporate income tax have the 
expected positive sign and are statistically significant. The unemployment rate has a 
negative, statistically significant sign in the favorite specification, which may be seen as a 
surprising finding because it is usually argued that the higher the unemployment rate the 
more labor is supplied in the shadow economy. People simply try to earn additional 
income to compensate utility losses due to unemployment. However, Tanzi (1999) as well 
as Buehn and Schneider (2012) argue that the effect of unemployment on the shadow 
economy is ambiguous, i.e., both a positive and negative sign may be observed in an 
empirical analysis. Buehn and Schneider’s line of reasoning is as follows: income losses 
due to unemployment may reduce demand in both the shadow and official economies 
(income effect). At the same time, substitution of official demand for goods and services 
for unofficial demand may take place as unemployed workers turn to the shadow 
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economy – where cheaper goods and services make it easier to countervail utility losses 
(substitution effect). This behavior may stimulate additional demand in the shadow 
economy. If the income effect exceeds the substitution effect, a negative relationship 
develops. Likewise, if the substitution effect exceeds the income effect, the relationship is 
positive. Moreover, the ambiguous effect of unemployment on the shadow economy may 
not only be due to the countervailing forces of the income and substitution effect but a 
consequence of a supply side effect when the unemployed search for and take up jobs in 
the shadow economy. While the shadow economy in this case clearly increases, the 
behavior of the unemployment rate depends on whether informal worker are considered 
unemployed in the official statistics or not. In the case informal workers are considered 
unemployed and part of the official unemployment statistics, the unemployment rate does 
not change. However, if informal workers are not considered unemployed unemployment 
decreases and one would observe a negative relationship between the shadow economy 
and unemployment. Hence, the relationship between unemployment and the shadow 
economy is less clear and is – as explained above – theoretically ambiguous. It is thus not 
unlikely to observe a negative coefficient in an empirical analysis. The remaining causes, 
personal income tax rate, the business freedom index, and the self-employment rate have 
positive signs but are not statistically significant. 
Concerning the indicators of the shadow economy, the results are less conclusive. 
The labor force participation rate and the growth rate of official real GDP per capita are 
not statistically significant in the MIMIC model specification 8-2-6. In the two alternative 
models the signs are positive and negative with reference to labor force participation rate 
and the growth rate of official real GDP, respectively. This makes the empirical results of 
these indicators of the shadow economy inconclusive. The currency ratio is in neither 
 22 
specification statistically significant. To summarize: In general, the results are somewhat 
mixed; only the estimated coefficients of the tax burden and the corporate tax rate are 
consistent with previous findings of the literature. 
Looking at the estimated coefficients of the causes for fiscal illusion we also find, as 
expected, the tax burden to have a positive, highly statistically significant coefficient. The 
self-employment rate is not statistically significant, neither is the top income tax rate. The 
secondary school enrolment rate (education) has the expected negative sign and is 
statistically significant, confirming our theoretical considerations that a more educated 
society makes it more difficult for policymakers to effectively delude the true tax burden. 
Concerning the indicators of fiscal illusion, central government debt as percentage of 
GDP and the ratio of indirect taxes to direct taxes show unexpected signs in the MIMIC 
model specification 8-2-6. The Herfindahl index of tax system complexity has the 
expected, highly statistically significant negative sign in the MIMIC 8-2-6 and MIMIC 6-
2-6 models. In specification 7-2-6 the sign is positive; however, we do not consider this 
result as conclusive due to the lack of statistical robustness. 
Finally, we turn to interpret the coefficients indicating the influence from the shadow 
economy to fiscal illusion and vice versa. While the coefficient describing the influence 
of the shadow economy on fiscal illusion is positive but statistically insignificant in the 
preferred specification, the coefficient describing the influence of fiscal illusion on the 
shadow economy is negative and statistically significant. When interpreting the negative 
link between fiscal illusion and the shadow economy one should take into account the fact 
that an increasing tax burden contributes to more shadow economic activities and – at the 
same time – encourages the government to implement a tax policy aimed to increase 
fiscal illusion. Thus, the rationale behind the result of a higher level of fiscal illusion 
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decreasing the shadow economy potentially is that policymakers aim to reduce the 
incentives for tax evasion through fiscal illusion mainly in countries with a large shadow 
economy. One measure policymakers may use, which is empirically supported by our 
model, is to systematically delude taxpayers.  
For the link from the shadow economy to fiscal illusion, we find a positive effect; an 
increase of shadow economic activities increases fiscal illusion, all other things being 
equal. The rationale for this finding may be that a large shadow economy potentially 
erodes the quality of institutions and people’s appreciation for the state. Policymakers 
who lose credit may wish to use several strategies to limit the size of the shadow 
economy. In this sense, policymakers in countries with larger shadow economies have 
more incentives to adopt policies to delude the true burden of taxation compared to 
policymakers in countries with smaller shadow economies and a higher degree of tax 
compliance. In this way, policymakers may avoid a further increase of tax evasion and 
shadow economic activities. The available empirical evidence confirms our finding that 
countries with a higher level of fiscal illusion are often the ones with sizable shadow 
economies (Dell’Anno and Mourao 2012). An alternative interpretation may be that the 
shadow economy is just another form of fiscal illusion. In the presence of the shadow 
economy a difference exists between the official (average) tax burden and the real 
(average) tax burden. Honest taxpayers thus bear the burden paying to much taxes to 
compensate the loss of tax revenues through tax evasion and shadow economic activities, 
i.e., the individual tax burden for honest taxpayers is on average higher than what 
journalists, politicians and official statistics report. 
To summarize: the estimated MIMIC model presents empirical evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that a higher average tax burden encourages a government to adopt tax 
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policies aimed at increasing the level of fiscal illusion. Combining this result with (a) the 
negative effect of fiscal illusion on the shadow economy and (b) the positive correlation 
between the shadow economy and the tax burden, we find that the total (i.e. direct and 
indirect) effect of an increase of the tax burden decreases shadow economic activities 
( )15 25 21 .006β β η+ = − .12 An economic interpretation of this result may be that an increase 
of the tax burden causes a policy response, i.e. to implementation of fiscal illusion 
policies, which exceeds the citizen’s incentives to participate in the shadow economy. 
Hence, policymakers overshoot with their policy response. 
Further, we find a negative correlation between the level of education and fiscal 
illusion, i.e., β28<0. In this sense, the result supports the argument that a more educated 
society reduces the effectiveness of fiscal illusion policies and thus the incentives of 
policymakers to implement measures to distort taxpayers’ perceptions. The self-
employment rate, the top statutory personal income tax rate, the Business Freedom index, 
and the OECD dummy are not statistical different form zero. Regarding the indicators, 
i.e., the most common strategies to reduce citizens’ perceptions of their true tax burden, 
we find the ratio of public debt to GDP to have the expected sign. Unfortunately, the 
coefficient is not statistical significant. The estimated coefficient for the second indicator, 
the ratio of indirect to direct tax revenue, does not support the Mill hypothesis. Its sign is 
unexpectedly negative. Finally, the Herfindahl index of a tax and revenue system’s 
complexity is, as expected, negative.  Governments that wish the increase the level of 
fiscal illusion to let taxpayers underestimate the true tax burden, seem to design more 
complicated and complex tax and revenue systems, all other things being equal. 
                                                 
12
 Direct and indirect effects are 
 
β15 = ∂SE∂Tax Burden = .009  and 
 
β25η21 = ∂SE∂IF
∂IF
∂Tax Burden = −.015
, 
respectively. 
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4. Conclusion 
This paper aims to extend the empirical literature on the relationship between fiscal 
illusion and the shadow economy, making the attempt to simultaneously estimate both 
latent variables in a MIMIC model using a sample of 104 developed and developing 
countries. Our empirical results show that a higher statutory tax burden positively 
contributes to the size and development of the shadow economy and incentivizes the 
government to increase the level of fiscal illusion. Thus, changes of the tax burden will 
induce opposing responses of policy maker and citizens that, with respect to the total 
effect on the shadow economy, may cancel each other out. In our sample however, the 
total effect is a higher tax burden reducing the size of the shadow economy due to the 
effect of fiscal illusion. Fiscal illusion policies are however less effective the higher the 
educational level of citizens on average is. Most importantly, this paper presents for the 
first time a simultaneous analysis of the two latent variables shadow economy and fiscal 
illusion. The estimated coefficients of the relationship between them indicate that the 
shadow economy may positively impact fiscal illusion, that is, an increase of the shadow 
economy also leads to an increase of fiscal illusion. The reason may be a deterioration of 
the quality of institutions and attitudes towards the state. Policymakers may react to this 
trend using strategies to delude the true tax burden in order to deplete shadow economic 
activities. Alternatively, shadow economic activities may be just another form of fiscal 
illusion. Fiscal illusion though negatively impacts the shadow economy, meaning that 
higher levels of fiscal illusion decrease the shadow economy: Policymakers obviously 
aim to reduce the incentives for tax evasion and shadow economic activities through 
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illusion, which is probably a fair strategy mainly in countries where the shadow economy 
sector is sizable.  
In general, our empirical results are promising but have to be interpreted with 
caution, as they are not as robust as we would have liked them and should thus be seen as 
a first step only. However, from a methodological viewpoint, the approach utilized in our 
paper underlines the complexity of the relationship between the two phenomena fiscal 
illusion and the shadow economy. In this sense, it highlights the need to apply systematic 
statistical approaches, such as MIMIC modeling techniques, to investigate the nature of 
these latent phenomena. 
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Appendix A: Data sources 
 Name Source Mean Obs. 
X1 
Personal Income 
Tax 
Personal Income Tax to GDP; IMF GFS Database, OECD 
Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 5.16 1566 
X2 
Corporate Income 
Tax 
Corporate Income Tax to GDP; IMF GFS Database, OECD 
Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 2.83 1633 
X3 Unemployment Unemployment rate; WDI database 8.30 1547 
X4 Business Freedom Business freedom; Heritage Foundation 68.37 1494 
X5 Tax Revenue 
Total Revenues to GDP; IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue 
Statistics, CEPAL 29.38 1713 
X6 Self-Employment 
Total self-employed workers as a proportion of total 
employment; WDI 28.33 1370 
X7 
Top personal 
income tax rate 
Top statutory PIT rate (%); World Tax Indicators, International 
Center for Public Policy 35.49 1604 
X8 Education School enrolment, secondary (% gross); WDI 78.75 1718 
X9 OECD Dummy variable: 1 if OECD countries and 0 otherwise 0.29 2184 
 
    
Y1 Labor force part. Labor force participation rate; WDI 62.67 2184 
Y2 Growth GDP GDP per capita growth, annual (%); WDI 1.80 2163 
Y3 Currency ratio M0 over M1; IMF - International Financial Statistics 2.03 1774 
Y4 
Normalized 
Herfindahl Index 
of Revenue 
{[Taxes on goods and services (% of revenue)2 + taxes on 
income (% revenue)2 + social security contributions (% 
revenues)2 + other taxes (% of revenue)2] + [100 – (Taxes on 
goods and services (% of revenue) + taxes on income (% 
revenue) + social security contributions (% revenues) + other 
taxes (% of revenue))]2 - 1/5)}/[10000-(1/5)]; WDI 
0.36 1314 
Y5 Public Debt Central government debt, total (% of GDP); WDI 58.18 866 
Y6 
Indirect Tax / 
Direct Tax 
Ratio of indirect and direct tax revenues (i.e., ratio of taxes on 
goods and services / taxes on income, profits and capital gains); 
WDI 
1.88 1308 
 
 
List of countries: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, P.R., Hong Kong, Colombia, Congo Dem. Rep., 
Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea S., Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix B: RAM representation of MIMIC 8-2-6 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
y
y
y
y
y
y
f
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
12
13
24
25
26
11 12 13 14 15 16 12
25 26 27 28 21
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
β β β β β β η
β β β β η

























1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
1 1
2 2
x x
x x
x x
x x
x x
x x
x x
x x
y
y
y
y
y
y
f
f
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ζ
ζ
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
+    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
 
11
21 22
33
44
51 52 55
66
75 77
88
11
21 22
33
42 44
55
66
21
0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
P ε
ε ε
ε
ε ε
ε
ε
σ
σ σ
σ
σ
σ σ σ
σ
σ σ
σ
θ
θ θ
θ
θ θ
θ
θ
ψ











=












 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
Where: σ ii  is the variance of the observable cause xi; θiiε  is the variance of the 
measurement error εi ; 11 22ψ ψ=  are the variances of the latent variables f1 and f2 fixed 
to be equal to 1; all elements off the diagonal are the respective covariances. 
